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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
--000O000— 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
vs . 
Case No. 940178-CA 
ROGER BLOMQUIST and 
LINDA EDENFIELD, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
--000O000— 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Authority for said appeal is found within the confine of 
Section Rule 26 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure; Utah 
State Constitution Article I, Section 12; Utah Code Annotated 
Section 77-1-6 (g); and Section 78-2-2 (i) Utah Code 
Annotated, and the Rule of the Utah Court of Appeals. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
The defendants herein were convicted of controlled 
substance violations. The defendants tendered a plea of 
guilty to the offenses but reserved the right to preserved 
the defendant's right to appeal from the defendant's motion 
to suppress. The defendant presented to the the trial court 
a motion to suppress arguing that the initial stop of the 
defendant Edenfield was without lawful cause and that the 
search warrant was issued without probable cause. 
The trial court denied the defendant motion to suppress. 
A copy of the ruling is attached hereto within the addendum. 
The factual basis for such motion is set out in the statement 
of facts. A transcript has been prepared of said hearing. 
Defendants herein argue that the trial court errored in 
the denial of such motion. The trial court made findings of 
facts in support of the court's ruling which are without 
factual basis. 
The defendant Edenfield was stopped prior to the 
issuance of the search warrant. The stop was made at 
approximately 10:35 a.m. but the search warrant was not 
executed til 11:32 a.m. The officers herein arrested, 
detained and search the defendant Edenfield prior to judical 
authorization. No other authority existed to justify the 
search. 
The officers herein executed a search warrant on the 
Blomquist home. Said warrant was not based on sufficient 
probable cause. Defendant contends that the affidavit is 
based on hearsay from unidentified informants lacking 
reliability. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The matter came before the Court on hearing of the 
defendant's Motion to Suppress. The matter was heard before 
the Honorable Boyd K. Park on August 26, 1993. The Court 
denied the defendant's Motion to Suppress. Subsequent 
thereto, the defendants entered pleas of guilty reserving 
their right to appeal on the issues presented herein. 
At the suppression hearing, the prosecution called in 
support of their position, Officer Cody Cullimore, Officer 
Shawn Adamson, Officer Michael Blackhurst, and Officer Dennis 
Harris. The defense called Linda Edenfield. A copy of the 
Court's ruling is attached within the addendum. 
Officer Cody Cullimore testified that he was a peace 
officer for Pleasant Grove City on the date of March 11, 
1993. He occupied the position of detective in the Pleasant 
Grove Police Department. T5L9. On the subject date of March 
11, 1993, Office Cullimore was involved with the Narcotics 
Task Force for Utah County. T5L12. He was assigned to 
maintain surveillance on the Roger Blomquist home. T5L16. 
The home is located at 126 South Main, Pleasant Grove, Utah, 
less than one block from the Pleasant Grove Police 
Department. T5L25. The surveillance commenced at the hour 
of 9:00 a.m. on March 11, 1993. T6L3. 
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Officer Cullimore was working in cooperation with other 
officers of his own Pleasant Grove Police Department and the 
Narcotics Task Force. He was under the supervision of 
Officer Blackhurst of the Pleasant Grove Police Department. 
T6L9. As Officer Cullimore commenced his surveillance, 
Officer Blackhurst was attempting to prepare a search warrant 
to commence a search of the Blomquist home. T6L9. Officer 
Cullimore anticipated that the search warrant would authorize 
a search of the residence, the vehicles at the residence, and 
the persons at the residence. T6L14. Officer Cullimore knew 
that Mr. Blomquist owned the home and Linda Edenfield was a 
visitor. T6L20. 
Office Cullimore observed Mr. Blomquist and Ms. 
Edenfield leave the residence and get into a truck which 
belonged to Roger Blomquist. T6L25. He noticed that they 
traveled to a convenience store known as BJ's Short Stop 
located in Pleasant Grove (T7L11); two blocks from the 
residence. T7L14. Mr. Cullimore knew that the defendant 
Blomquist had a traffic warrant issued for his arrest. 
T7L20. Officer Cullimore advised the patrol unit that the 
vehicle was moving and he would like it stopped before it 
left the area. T7L25. The vehicle was stopped at the 
location of 60 South Main in Pleasant Grove, Utah. Mr. 
Blomquist was arrested on the warrant and Ms. Edenfield was 
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taken out of the vehicle and detained while they determined 
what would happen next. T8L7-10. 
At the Preliminary Hearing, Officer Cullimore testified 
that the arrest occurred prior to the execution of the search 
warrant authorizing the same, it occurred at approximately 
10:00 a.m. on the morning of March 11, 1993. T9L11-13. The 
officer's police report indicates that the arrest of Ms. 
Edenfield and Mr. Blomquist occurred between 10:30 a.m. and 
11:00 a.m. on March 11, 1993. T9L14-15. A search warrant 
was not executed by the Court or Magistrate until 11:32 a.m. 
on March 11, 1994. T9L20. 
The officer reports that he had made the stop of the 
vehicle; arrested Roger Blomquist on the traffic warrant; and 
Ms. Edenfield was requested to step out of the vehicle and 
then subsequently arrested. Officer Cullimore reports that he 
had received information over the radio that a search warrant 
had been executed. Upon cross examination, Officer Cullimore 
conceded in his police report, that he had advised that the 
search warrant was being merely prepared at the time of the 
arrest and search. T10L7-9. At the 'Motion to Suppress1 
hearing, Officer Cullimore advised that he had received a 
report that the search warrant was prepared or issued. This 
communication was shortly after the traffic stop was made and 
while they were at the site of the vehicle stop T10L18-24. 
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The Blomquist residence is located at 12 6 South Main. 
BJ's Short Stop is 100 West Center. T12L7-8. It would take 
only a couple of minutes for Blomquist/Edenfield to get to 
the Blomquist residence from BJ's Short Stop. T12L13. 
Defendants were returning home when stopped one-half block 
from the Blomquist residence. T12L14-15. The stop of the 
Blomquist vehicle was made at 10:35 a.m. T12L21. 
The officer initially reports that Ms. Edenfield was 
simply stopped and detained because she was a passenger in 
the Blomquist vehicle. T13L3-4. However, it is noted that 
three police cars were present at the time of the initial 
stop for the supposed traffic warrant. T13L17-19. The stop 
was made at approximately 10:35 a.m. and Blomquist and 
Edenfield were booked in the Pleasant Grove Police Department 
at 11:00 a.m. The police department is only one block away 
from the Blomquist residence and 1 1/2 blocks from the 
supposed traffic stop. 
At the time of the initial vehicular stop, Officer 
Cullimore was aware that the search warrant had not been 
executed but the officers were in the process of obtaining 
it. T14L8-9. 
Officer Cullimore reports that Ms. Edenfield was 
transported to the Pleasant Grove Police Department/Jail 
between the time of 10:40 a.m. and 11:00 a.m. T17L5; within 
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five minutes from the original traffic stop. T17L9. 
Officer Cullimore received instruction to transport her to 
the Police Department from Blackhurst. At the Police 
Department, Ms. Edenfield was searched. The basis for such 
search being that the officer believed that she was covered 
within the scope of the search warrant, although it was not 
signed nor issued. T18L1. Ms. Edenfield was searched by a 
female dispatcher in a closed room. T18L5. She was 
subjected to a strip search at the Pleasant Grove Jail. 
T18L9. Her purse was also searched at that time. T18L18. 
This was also done on the basis of the purported search 
warrant. T18L20. Ms. Edenfield1s purse had been taken from 
her person at the time of the initial stop. T20L6. A small 
pack of Methamphetamine was found to be contained within said 
purse. T20L17. 
The booking time of Ms. Edenfield into the Pleasant 
Grove Police Department was 11:00 a.m. T19L7. This was 
preceded by the stop, detention and the search. 
Officer Harris testified being called by the 
prosecution. Officer Harris is the Deputy Utah County 
Sheriff currently assigned to the Narcotics Task Force for 
Utah County. T22L18-23. Officer Harris was assigned to 
assist in the search warrant execution that day. He had also 
received the assignment to assist Officer Cullimore in the 
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stop of the Blomquist vehicle. T23L6-9. Officer Harris 
advises that he received information that the search warrant 
had been issued. He received that information at 11:39 a.m. 
T25L17-21. 
Officer Harris's credibility as to the time sequence is 
bolstered by the fact that he maintains an accurate record of 
the dates and particular times herein with the use of a tape 
recorder which magnetically stamps the time and date as he 
records the conversation. T27L10-11. He verifies the 
accuracy of the tape recorder clock by comparing it to his 
wrist watch. T27L14-23. He was not at the scene but 
reported to the scene upon request. He received the 
communication of the vehicle stop at 10:38 a.m. T28 L 13. 
Officer Harris reports that the vehicle had been 
impounded at 11:04 a.m. At 11:39 a.m., Officer Harris made 
an entry on his tape that the search warrant had finally been 
signed and officers were on their way. T29L2-6. Officer 
Harris advises that at the time of the stop of the Blomquist 
vehicle, the search warrant had not been signed. T29L21-22. 
He was at the Blomquist home at 11:39 a.m. when he learned 
that it had, in fact, been signed. T30L14. 
Officer Harris reports that Ms. Edenfield was detained 
because they had received prior information that she was, in 
fact, bringing drugs in. T33L5. Sergeant Blackhurst had 
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apparently advised Officers Harris and Cullimore that he 
wanted Ms. Edenfield questioned and taken to the Police 
Department (T33L23-25); this detainment occurring prior to 
the warrant's execution. They did so although they had not 
received any communication that the warrant had actually been 
signed. T35L11-16. 
Officer Blackhurst was called by the prosecution. 
Officer Blackhurst is a police officer with the State of 
Utah/ employed through the Pleasant Grove Police Department, 
currently assigned to the Utah County Narcotics Task Force. 
T37L13-21. Officer Blackhurst was advised over the air that 
the Blomquist vehicle was leaving the Blomquist residence. 
Officer Blackhurst reports that the search warrant was 
signed at 11:32 a.m. by Judge Dimick in the Orem Circuit 
Court. T41L13-19. Officer Blackhurst supervised the search 
of the Blomquist residence. The search commenced at the hour 
of 11:46 a.m. T42L15. 
Officer Blackhurst advises that he did not advise 
Officer Cullimore to take Ms. Edenfield to the police station 
for questioning. T43L21-22. 
The prosecution then called Officer Shawn Adamson to the 
stand. Officer Adamson is a police officer to the Utah 
County Sheriff' s Office, assigned to the Narcotics Task 
Force. T48L23-T49L2. Officer Adamson indicates that they 
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were unsure of Blomquist/Edenfieldfs destination and felt it 
necessary to stop them until they could complete the search. 
T50L2-4. 
Ms. Linda Edenfield was called by the defendants. She 
advised that she was stopped by the Pleasant Grove police 
officers on March 11, 1993. T53L2-3. They pulled the 
vehicle over and took Mr. Blomquist out one door and placed 
him in the other police car. They took Ms. Edenfield out the 
other door almost contemporaneously and placed her into a 
police car. They then transported them to the police 
station. They advised her at the police station that she was 
going to be voluntarily forced to complete a strip search. 
They then took her into a room to commence the search. 
T53L6-12. The officers completed the strip search upon Ms. 
Edenfield. T53L15-16. 
Ms. Edenfield was advised that she would either 
volunteer for the strip search or they would stand right 
there until the warrant was signed and then she would be 
subjected to a strip search. T53L21-23. Th..s was 
communicated by one of the Pleasant Grove police officers. 
T54L1-6. Ms. Edenfield reports that she had no choice in the 
matter. They placed her immediately into the police car and 
took her to the police station. T54L20-23. She was forced 
to submit to the strip search. T55L1. She was advised to 
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submit to a cavity search where she was ordered to "bend over 
and spread them". T55L12. She was ordered to pull apart the 
lips of her vagina. T55L16-17. They checked her clothing 
one piece at a time and then gave them back to her. T55L19-
20. They then placed her into a cell. T55L22. Then they 
went through her purse. T55L24. She advised that this was 
completed well before the hour of 11:00 a.m. She was in the 
room at the police department for quite awhile. They came to 
get her keys to the car and then brought her keys back to 
her. They then once again retrieved her keys and did not 
return them a second time. T56L11-19. She was a passenger 
in the Blomquist vehicle. T57L1. She reports that at the 
initial traffic stop, they took Mr. Blomquist from the 
vehicle and then turned to her and advised her that "yes 
please come with me". They immediately thereafter placed her 
in the police car. T57L10-18. 
The search of the Blomquist residence was commence at 
11:49 a.m. It was based upon a search warrant executed by 
Magistrate, John C. Backlund, of the American Fork Circuit 
Court. The search warrant authorized the search of the 
persons of Roger Blomquist and Linda Edenfield. It also 
authorized the search of the residence of the suspects 
located at 126 South Main, Pleasant Grove, Utah, and 
surrounding outbuildings. 
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In addition, the search warrant authorized a search of 
the suspect vehicle, a 1981 Chevrolet Corvette bearing Nevada 
license plate #693 EPS. The search warrant was issued based 
upon an Affidavit in Support of and Motion for a Search 
Warrant. 
The affiant is Michael Blackhurst, a Pleasant Grove 
Police Officer. The substance of the data contained within 
said search warrant is the following: 
1992 INFORMATION 
In September 1992, Detective Andre Leavitt received 
information from an unnamed confidential informant that Roger 
Blomquist was involved in distribution and use of controlled 
substances. See paragraph 4. No other information is given 
regarding the basis of such a conclusion by said unnamed 
confidential informant. The only supporting basis being that 
this supposed confidential informant has supplied information 
on as many as four individuals who were involved in 
distribution of controlled substances and his or her 
information has proven reliable. The date of the affidavit 
is April 11, 1993; seven months after the fact. 
1993 INFORMATION 
It is reported in the affidavit that on January 28, 
1993, Mr. Blackhurst received information from an anonymous 
informant who stated that Linda Edenfield, a girlfriend of 
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Roger Blomquist, was driving to Las Vegas in a tan and brown 
Chevrolet Corvette. The anonymous informant stated that the 
reason for these trips was to pick up controlled substances 
to be delivered back to Roger Blomquist. It is reported by 
this anonymous informant that these trips occur approximately 
every two weeks and Linda carries a gun concealed in a 
compartment behind her seat. See paragraph 6. Upon inquiry 
as to the reliability of said informant, Officer Blackhurst 
disclosed that this supposed tip came from an ex-boyfriend of 
Ms. Edenfield. 
The affiant then reports that on March 4, 1993, the 
affiant again received other information from an anonymous 
informant who stated that a telephone conversation had been 
overheard in which Roger Blomquist stated Linda Edenfield 
would be delivering a load within the next five to six days. 
See paragraph 7. No other data regarding reliability is set 
out in the affidavit. We do not know the source of the 
information nor the reliability of the data. 
On March 4, 1993, it was discovered that a tan and brown 
Corvette was not at the residence of Roger Blomquist. This 
contradicted the previous tip and draws into question its 
reliability. It is reported that on March 11, 1993, this tan 
and brown Corvette finally appeared at the Blomquist 
residence. 
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1993-ADDITIQNAL DATA 
Apparently a surveillance was conducted upon the 
Blomquist home. Officer Lee Fox recalled observing a vehicle 
bearing Utah license plate #942 BHN. The vehicle was 
registered to a Linda lorge. Officer Fox recalled that he 
conducted a search warrant on the lorge residence in 1989 
wherein the son of Linda lorge was arrested on several counts 
of distribution of controlled substances. No further 
information is given as to the identity of any individuals in 
said vehicle, nor participation, nor appearances at said 
home. See paragraph 9. 
A record check was made of Roger Blomquist and Linda 
Edenfield. It was found that Roger Blomquist had a criminal 
record involving a controlled substance with a conviction in 
March, 1984. See paragraph 10. The record indicated that 
Linda Edenfield had a criminal history indicating that she 
had been charged but never convicted of possession of cocaine 
in 1988 and two counts of possession of controlled substances 
in 1989. See paragraph 11. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. Prior to judical approval of a search warrant to 
search the Blomquist home and its occupants, the Court must 
be presented an affidavit setting out sufficient basis to 
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establish probable cause. In the current case, the affidavit 
was lacking. The warrant was lacking because: 
a. The warrant was anticipatory of drugs be brought into 
Utah from Nevada. It was based on a tip from an informant. 
The affiant did not provide any basis upon which the judge 
could determine the informant's reliability and consequently 
it lacked the requisite probable cause. 
b. The affiant attempted to corroborate the tip by 
referring to a previous informant's tip. Said tip was also 
unreliable since it failed to indentify the basis upon which 
the informant believed Blomquist to be traffiking in 
narcotics. Further the information was stale, being seven (7) 
months old. Additional information was supplied. It also was 
stale and lacked relevancy. The additional information 
including that the defendant Blomquist had previously been 
convicted of a controlled substance violation in 1984. 
Defendant Edenfield had been arrested but charge with 
criminal offense in 1989. A vehicle was seen in the 
proximity to the Blomquist home. The vehicle belonged to 
another whose son had been associated with narcotics in 1989. 
2. The officers herein detained, arrested and then 
strip-searched the defendant Edenfield prior to the search 
warrant's execution. No justification existed to make the 
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arrest excepting the warrant which was not executed til one 
hour later. No exigent circumstances existed to justify the 
officer's taking such action. 
ARGUMENT 
MEMORANDUM OF LAW 
An individual's right to be free from unreasonable 
search and seizures is protected and guaranteed both by the 
Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and by the 
provisions of Article I, Section 14 of the Utah State 
Constitution. The provisions are almost identical. The 
Fourth Amendment provides as follows: 
The right of people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable 
searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no 
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause 
supported by oath or affirmation, particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the person 
or things to be seized. 
The balance between public interest and the individual's 
constitutionally guaranteed right to personal security and 
privacy tilts in favor of freedom from police interference. 
Brown v. Texas, U.S. 47 (1979). 
POINT I 
THE AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF THE ISSUANCE OF THE SEARCH 
WARRANT WAS LACKING. IT DID NOT RAISE TO THE LEVEL OF 
PROBABLE CAUSE. THE SEARCH WARRANT WAS AN ANTICIPATORY 
WARRANT AND WAS BASED ON: 
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A. CONCLUSIONARY STATEMENTS 
B. UNNAMED INFORMANTS LACKING RELIABILITY 
C. STALE AND INCONCLUSIVE INFORMATION 
PROBABLE CAUSE DEFINED 
It is fundamental that probable cause needs to be found 
within the four corners of the affidavit to support a search 
warrant's issuance. The Fourth Amendment requires that when a 
search warrant is issued on the basis of an affidavit, the 
affidavit must contain specific facts sufficient to support 
the determination by a neutral magistrate that probable cause 
exists. State v. Droneburgr 781 P.2d 1303 (Utah App. 1989) 
United States v. Rubior 727 F.2d 786 (9th Cir. 1983). 
Probable cause means more than 'bears suspicion '. 
Probable cause exists where the facts and circumstances 
within the affiant's knowledge and which they had reasonably 
trustworthy information are sufficient to warrant a man of 
reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been or 
is being committed. Brinegar v. United Statesf 338 U.S. 160 
(1949). 
The cause necessary to make a thing probable is 
determined under an objective standard. An affidavit is 
sufficient when it demonstrates in some trustworthy fashion 
the likelihood that an offense has been or is to be committed 
and there is sound reason to believe that a particular search 
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will turn up evidence of it. United States v. Nocella, 84 9 
F.2d 33 (1st Cir. 1988.), United States v. Mims, 812 F.2d 
1068 (8th Cir. 1987), United States v. Jenkins, 901 F.2d 1075 
(11th Cir. 1990) . Further, for probable cause to be met, the 
affidavit must set out the reliability of the informant or 
information. Rubber-stamping police officer's request is 
forbidden. State v. Proneburg, infra. 
A. Anticipatory Warrants 
In the present setting, the officers anticipated, based 
on the April, 1993, tip, that Edenfield was to deliver to 
Utah narcotics within five (5) to six (6) days from March 4. 
Based on this tip, Officer Blackhurst sought to obtain the 
warrant. 
In cases of anticipatory warrants, an affidavit 
supporting the application for anticipatory warrant must 
show: 
1. The agent believes that a delivery of 
contraband is going to occur; 
2. How he has obtained this belief: 
3. How reliable his sources are; 
4. What part the government agents will play 
in the delivery. United States v. Garcia, 
882 F.2d 699 (2nd Cir. 1989). 
Judicial officers must then scrutinize whether there is 
probable cause to believe that the delivery will occur, and 
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whether there is probable cause to believe that the 
contraband will be located on the premises when the search 
takes place. Moreover, when an anticipatory warrant issues, 
the magistrate should protect against its premature execution 
by listing in the warrant conditions governing the execution 
which are explicit, clear and narrowly drawn so as to avoid 
misunderstanding or manipulation by government agents. 
United States v. Garcia, 882 F.2d 699 (2nd Cir. 1989). 
Here the affiant failed to set out the reliability of 
the sources. The April tip was received from an unnamed 
informant. (This tip was received from the angry ex-
boyfriend of Edenfield.) No effort was attempted to set out 
the reliability of the tipster. None was available. No 
effort was made to set out why the informant believed the 
drugs were to be delivered on or before March 9 or 10. 
The warrant and its supporting affidavit is much like 
the warrant issued in State v. Droneburg, supra. In 
Droneburgr the State conceded that probable cause was 
lacking. The affidavit revealed that the Sheriff had 
received confidential information from a confidential 
informant that methamphetamine was to be delivered to a 
residence in Panguitch. The informant advised the Sheriff 
that the individual delivering the methamphetamine had 
departed California and was to arrive in Panguitch at a 
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specified time. The Sheriff advised that the information was 
from a reliable informant. He had used this informant before 
and had found him to be reliable. 
The significant difference in Droneburg is that the 
informant was actually known by the Sheriff there and he had 
used him before. Here, we simply have a tip from an unknown 
informant. 
If this April, 1993 tip fails to meet probable cause, 
does the remaining portions of the affidavit bootstrap this 
unsubstantiated tip into probable cause? The prosecution 
attempted to corroborate this tip by referring to a 
conclusionary statement that in September, 1992 (seven months 
preceding), an informant advised fellow Officer Leavitt that 
Blomquist was involved in the distribution of narcotics. This 
conclusionary statement apparently came from an informant who 
had supposedly provided reliable information in the past 
(Droneburg). No effort was made to find out why the 
informant believed this had occurred or if it was ongoing; he 
merely offered his conclusion. State v. Droneburgf supra. 
B. Conclusionary Statements 
An affidavit must provide the magistrate with a 
substantial basis for determining the existence for probable 
cause and a wholly conclusory statement fails to meet this 
requirement. Sufficient information must be presented to the 
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magistrate to allow that official to determine probable 
cause; his actions cannot be a mere ratification of the 
conclusions of another. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 
(1983) . State v. Droneburg, supra. 
No attempts were made within the affidavit to suggest 
that the unsubstantiated tip of April was reliable. The 
question of reliability is crucial to discriminate between 
those which one can logically base a conclusion as opposed to 
those which may be generated by anger, hostility, or revenge, 
as here,when the angry ex-boyfriend is the informant. United 
States v. Delgadillo-Valesquez, 856 F.2d, 1292 (9th Cir. 
1988). Warrant and affidavit are suspect when they deal with 
unnamed informants; cautions must be exercised. United States 
v. Phillips, 727 F.2d 392 (5th Cir. 1984). State v. 
Droneburgr supra. 
C. Unnamed Informants 
The information delivered through the affidavit must be 
reliable. In Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983), the 
Supreme Court pronounced that it is first "highly relevant" 
as to how the informant obtained the information and, 
secondly, whether the informant has sufficient reliability. 
The Courts have held that unnamed informant's reliability 
needs to be established within the affidavit. United States 
v. Phillips, 727 F.2d 392 (5th Cir. 1984). State v. 
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Droneburg, supra. A tip is not reliable when the 
investigating officer or affiant has no means of knowing from 
whom it came or the past performance of the informant. 
United States v. Delgadmo-Valesguez, 856 F.2d, 1292 (9th 
Cir. 1988). 
An unnamed informer's tip does not rise even to the 
level of reasonable cause, let alone probable cause. An 
officer cannot, without further corroboration, stop a 
motorist based on a radio dispatch without factual 
foundations for the relayed message. State v. Thompsonr 231 
Neb. 772, 438 N.W.2d 131 (1989). See also State v. Roth, 181 
Utah Adv. Rep. 25 (1992). In Whitely v. Warden, Wyo. State 
Penitentiary, 401 U.S. 560, 91 S.Ct. 1031 (1971), the court 
held that the informer's tip is not sufficient to warrant 
arrest. 
Here the unsubstantiated April tip is from an unnamed 
informant without evidence of reliability. The magistrate 
was not provided any facts upon which to base the informant's 
reliability. The magistrate could not weed out those tips 
which may be generated, as this one, on ex-boyfriends, 
angered guests or vengeful persons. Without these facts, a 
magistrate would be simply a 'rubber stamp1 for the police 
validating their every request. The magistrate must 
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scrutinize the affidavit to protect the citizenry from 
unwarranted intrusions. State v. Droneburg, supra. 
Consequently, in this case of an anticipatory warrant 
based on an unsubstantiated tip, does the remaining portions 
of the affidavit allow one to conclude that probable cause 
exists? 
D. Staleness 
It is the fundamental principle of search and seizure 
law that information furnished in the application for the 
search warrant must be timely. A warrant application based 
upon stale information of previous misconduct is 
insufficient. It fails to create probable cause that similar 
or other improper conduct is continuing to occur. United 
States v. Bascerof 742 F.2d 1335. A warrant may be suspect 
because information upon which it rested was arguably too old 
to furnish present probable cause. United States v. McCallr 
740 F.2d. 1331 (4th Cir. 1984). Does a 10 year old 
conviction bear any relevance? Does a narcotic charge 
without conviction raise to any level of relevance? 
There are no statutory limits. However, it is manifest 
that proof must be of a fact so closely related to the time 
of the issuance of the warrant as to justify a probable cause 
finding. SGRO v. United States, 287 U.S. 206 (1932). It is 
fact sensitive whether the information is stale or 
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substantiates a continuing enterprise. State v. Singleton, 
214 Utah Adv. Rep. 30(June 1993). 
The reported September, 1993, tip is based on an unnamed 
informant that seven (7) months earlier indicated Blomquist 
was involved in narcotics. (This tip rises only to the level 
of State v. Droneburg facts, in that, it fails to specify how 
the information was obtained.) Staleness would also apply to 
the fact that Linda Iorge's vehicle appeared at the Blomquist 
residence and Officer Fox recalled searching Iorge's 
residence and finding that her son had used narcotics. This 
dates back to 1989. See paragraph 9 of affidavit. It 
presumes that the Iorgefs vehicle had something to do with 
controlled substances and that she or her son continued to be 
so involved since 1989. 
It is also reported that Blomquist had one controlled 
substance conviction in 1984. See paragraph 10. Edenfield 
had never been convicted but had apparently been charged with 
two counts involving controlled substances in 1988 and 1989. 
See paragraph 11. 
In controlled-buy situations, information of 3 days 
length was found to be too stale where no evidence of 
continuing drug possession or sales existed. People v. 
David, 326 N.W. 485 (Mich. App. 1982). Forty-two and 44 day 
old information was stale and a warrant relying on it is 
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suppressible. People v. Briolor 228 N.W.2d 456 (Mich. App. 
1975). 
In Commonwealth v. Maloner 567 N.E.2d 163 (Mass. App. Ct 
1987), a 7-11 day delay after observing marijuana was not 
permissible. In Sheppard v. State, 521 S.2d 288 (Fla. App. 
1988), a 30 day delay was too long. See also U.S. v. Stout, 
641 F.Supp. 1074, U.S. v. Nealr 500 F.2d 305 (10th Cir. 
1974) . 
Here they attempted to stretch a 1984 conviction to 
1993; suggesting Blomquist must thereby continue to be 
involved. They attempted to suggest the April tip must be 
reliable since the mother's car being at the Blomquist home's 
vicinity has some relevance since her son used drugs in 1989; 
that Edenfield's 1988 and 1989 drug charges have some 
relevance when they are 4-5 years old and did not even merit 
a conviction; and that a September 1993, tip supposedly from 
a reliable informant rendering his unsubstantiated conclusion 
that Blomquist is involved in distribution or use of 
controlled substances. 
What portions of the probable cause justify a search of 
the Blomquist home, its residents or vehicles at the home? 
POINT II 
THE STOP, DETAINMENT AND SUBSEQUENT SEARCH OF EDENFIELD 
WAS NOT AUTHORIZED BY THE WARRANT NOR EXIGENT 
CIRCUMSTANCES. 
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Ms. Edenfield was stopped by police at 10:35 a.m. She 
was detained, arrested, strip searched and then arrested; all 
before the warrant's execution at 11:32 a.m. The officers1 
conduct was based on the desire to detain, search and 
question her. All before the warrant's authorization. 
She was a passenger in the Blomquist vehicle. No 
criminal acts were observed. No justification existed for 
her detainment, search or arrest. The police anticipated 
that the anticipatory warrant would be issued and jumped the 
gun . 
To justify a particular intrusion, a police officer must 
be able to point to specific and articulable facts, which 
taken together with rational inferences, warrant such an 
intrusion. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 21 (1968), State v. 
Bruce, 779 P.2d 646, 650 (Utah 1989). 
In State v. Johnson, 805 P.2d 761 (Utah 1991), the Utah 
Supreme Court struck down a search and detention of a 
passenger. The Supreme Court held that the officers' 
detention of the passenger, beyond what was reasonably 
related in scope to the traffic stop, was not justified by 
any articulable suspicion that the defendant had committed a 
crime. The Court held that the leap from asking the 
passenger's name and date of birth to running a warrant check 
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on her, severed the chain of rational inferences of specific 
and articulable facts and degenerated into an attempt to 
support as yet an inarticulable suspicion or hunch. 
Any further detention for investigative questioning 
after the fulfillment of the purpose for the initial traffic 
stop is justified under the Fourth Amendment only if the 
detaining officer has reasonable suspicion of serious 
criminal activity. The detaining officer must be able to 
articulate a particularized and objective basis for their 
suspicion that is drawn from the totality of the 
circumstances facing them at the time of the seizure. United 
States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 (1981), State v. Mendoza, 748 
P.2d 181, 183 (Utah 1987). See also State v. Robinson, 797 
P.2d 431 (Utah App. 1990). State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127 
(Utah). Here none existed. 
Here Blomquist had been stopped and arrested based on a 
traffic warrant. The cause and detention is suspect due to 
the officer's ulterior intent. However, his detention is 
justified under current Utah law; State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 
1127 (Utah); but restrictions still apply. The detention may 
not last longer than warranted by the initial detention. 
Edenfield should have been free to go. 
The Utah Courts have allowed officers in certain 
situations, preceding the search warrants execution, to take 
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defined and restrained action to maintain the status quo of a 
purported drug transaction. State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255 
(Utah 1987) . In Ashe., there was a need to preserve evidence. 
However, only in a few specifically and well-delineated 
situations may the officer's action precede the warrant's 
execution. 
In State v. VanHolten, 767 P.2d 1288 (Utah Ct.App. 
1988), this Court struck down the search of a home, prior to 
the warrant's execution, where there was no danger of 
evidence being destroyed. Here no exigent circumstances 
existed to justify the initial and unlawful intrusion. No 
evidence was going to be destroyed. Officers were not at 
risk. 
The officers need to await the warrant's authorization. 
State v. Palmer, 803 P.2d 1249 (Utah App.1991). If they 
jumped the gun, they presume the warrant's execution thereby 
displacing the need for a neutral and independent review by 
an impartial magistrate. They may strategically act 
opportunistically without judicial restraint awaiting the 
arrival of the warrant to cover their actions. 
CONCLUSION 
Search warrants are not only preferable but 
constitutionally mandated to preserve valued freedoms of the 
citizenry. Police officers are limited in their actions by 
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constitutional mandate, enhancing our freedoms from 
unwarranted searches and seizures. The independent review by 
an impartial and neutral magistrate of probable cause is a 
guarded freedom not to be taken lightly or displaced by 
police. 
Officers cannot presume a Court's approval of a warrant. 
A search warrant must be based on sound reasoning meeting the 
constitutionally mandated test of 'probable cause1. A search 
warrant should not be issued based on rumors, speculation or 
possibilities. The police nor the Courts should be utilized 
to cause nuisance or seek revenge. The reported tips of 
unnamed informants need corroboration to prevent unwarranted 
intrusions. 
We cannot suppose criminal behavior by acts as a mother 
visiting a location if her son used drugs four years 
previously. We presume people to be innocent and that 10 
year old convictions bear little relevance to current acts; 
that charges of drug involvement are useless unless followed 
by convictions. We do not allow police nor their informants 
to supplant the judiciary by just adopting their conclusions. 
The Courts and the Constitution are our protections 
against unwarranted civil violations. i 
DATED this day of •°kr\*/xLr^\ r 1994. 
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ADDENDUM 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
LINDA ANN EDENFIELD and 
ROGER A. BLOMQUIST 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CASE NO. 931400385 and 
931400386 
DATE September 15, 1993 
BOYD L. PARK, JUDGE 
CLERK: LHH 
This matter came before the Court on Defendants' Motion to Suppress on August 26, 
1993. The plaintiff was represented by James R. Taylor, Esq. The defendants were 
represented by Shelden R. Carter, Esq. Police officers Cody Cullimore, Dennis Harris, 
Michael Blackhurst and Shawn Adamson were sworn and testified for the plaintiff. Linda 
Edenfield (now known as Blomquist) was sworn and testified for the defendants. 
The Court having heard the oral testimony , the arguments of counsel and having read 
Defendants' Motion to Suppress and the memorandum in support thereof and Plaintiffs 
Memorandum in Response to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss makes the following findings 
and ruling: 
1. Defendants have filed a Motion to Suppress alleging that their constitutional rights 
under the provisions of the Utah State Constitution, Article I, Section 14, have been violated 
by the police officers having stopped the vehicle in which the defendants were riding, 
personally searching the defendants and searching the Blomquist residence and placing the 
said defendants under arrest. Defendants contend that the probable cause affidavit in support 
of and motion for a search warrant was insufficient for the issuance of search warrants in the 
following particulars: 
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(a) The affidavit is based on conclusory statements and rumor, 
(b) The information is stale, 
(c) No factual basis for the reliability of anonymous informant, 
(d) Information acquired by the police officers was not reliable. 
Defendant Edenfield contends that she was placed under arrest and searched prior to the 
issuance of a warrant to search her person without articulable probable cause. 
2. Officer Cullimore testified that on the 11th day of March, 1993 certain police officers 
began a surveillance of the Blomquist residence. Officer Blackhurst was involved in 
acquiring a search warrant for the Blomquist home, the persons of defendants Blomquist and 
Edenfield, and the Edenfield automobile. While the Blomquist residence was under 
surveillance the defendants left the residence and entered a vehicle owned by defendant 
Blomquist. The police officers subsequently stopped the Blomquist vehicle and Officer 
Cullimore testified as to the approximate following times: The Blomquist vehicle was 
stopped sometime around 10:30 a.m.; Received a radio call that the warrant had been issued; 
Transported the defendants to the police department from approximately 10:40 a.m. to 11:00 
a.m., sometime within that time period; Mr. Blomquist was booked and arrested at 11:00 
a.m. Ms. Edenfield had her purse with her and was not taken into custody until the officer 
had received a radio call that the warrant had been issued. An examination of the search 
warrant indicated that it was issued at 11:30 a.m. 
3. Officer Harris testified that he participated in towing the Blomquist vehicle to the police 
station and that he followed standard procedure. Officer Harris testified to the following 
time sequences: The time of the stop of the vehicle was 10:38 hours.; The time of the 
telephone call to determine if the search warrant had been signed 11:39 hours.; Impounded 
the Blomquist vehicle 11:09 hours. Officer Harris was present when defendants were 
transported from the cite of the vehicle stop to the police station and testified that Sgt. Fox 
had told him at that time that the search warrant had been signed. 
4. Officer Blackhurst testified that he prepared and signed the probable cause affidavit in 
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support of motion for a search warrant. He took the said affidavit to Judge Dimick for his 
review and approval. Officer Blackhurst had informed the officers not to do any searching 
until the search warrant was issued. Officer Blackhurst called Officer Cullimore and told 
him that the search warrant had been signed. Officer Blackhurst believes that the time 
shown on the search warrant is actually the wrong time. Officer Blackhurst testified that he 
took from 10 to 15 minutes driving from the courthouse to the Blomquist residence. Officer 
Blackhurst testified that an inventory search started at 11:46 a.m. 
5. Officer Adamson testified that he went with Officer Blackhurst to acquire the search 
warrant. That Officer Blackhurst made a telephone call to tell the other officers that the 
search warrant had been signed. 
6. An examination of the probable cause affidavit indicates that the affidavit was 
subscribed and sworn to before Judge Joseph Dimick on the 11th day of March, 1993 at 
11:30 hours. An examination of the search warrant indicates that it was dated on the 11th 
day of March, 1992 at 11:30 a.m. The search warrant appears to have been typed from a 
form and that the typist picked up June 1992 and no one contends that this was actually 
signed other than the year 1993. 
7. It is not the intention of this court to recite everything that was said in the probable 
cause affidavit inasmuch as the affidavit is available and this court by reference incorporates 
the terms of the affidavit, but will make specific reference to specific provisions in the 
affidavit in this memorandum decision. It is also not the intent of this court to cite all of the 
cases that have been cited in the memorandums submitted by counsel. The court, however, 
is familiar with and has read the cases submitted by counsel and the court is convinced that 
the current law in the state of Utah is the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis of the 
affidavit and the search warrant. The Utah courts have used the Agular-Spinelli two-prong 
test as part of the totality-of-the-circumstances. The informant's reliability and basis of 
knowledge to relevant considerations, among others in determining the existence of probable 
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cause under a totality-of-the-circumstances. State v. Singleton. 214 Ut. Adv. Rpts. 30 at 32. 
The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical common sense decision 
whether (given all of the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, and knowing 
the veracity and basis of knowledge of a person supplying hearsay information) there is a fair 
probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place. The 
duty of a reviewing court is simply to insure that the magistrate had a substantial basis for 
...concluding that probable cause existed. Illinois v. Gates. Jones v. United States, citations 
omitted. 
8. The affidavit of Officer Blackhurst in paragraphs 4 through 7 contain (1) information 
received from a confidential informant known to Officer Blackhurst, had proven to be as 
reliable through other investigative methods; (2) information from an anonymous informant 
on January 28, 1993; and (3) information from another anonymous informant on March 4, 
1993. That based on the information received from the three informants a surveillance was 
conducted at the residence of defendant Blomquist. On March 11, 1993 the Corvette 
described by the anonymous informant arrived at the Blomquist residence. In paragraph 9 of 
the affidavit Sgt. Lee Fox observed a vehicle registered to a Linda Iorg and Sgt. Fox had a 
memory of conducting a search on the Iorg residence in 1989 where the son of Linda Iorg 
was arrested on several counts of distribution of controlled substance. Paragraph 10 
indicates that a records check was made and the records check indicated that defendant 
Blomquist had a criminal record involving controlled substance with a conviction in March of 
1984 and that there was an outstanding misdemeanor warrant for his arrest from the Pleasant 
Grove City court. Paragraph 11 indicates that a records check of defendant Edenfield 
indicated a criminal history whereby Edenfield had been charged with possession of cocaine 
in 1988 and two counts of possession of a controlled substance in 1989. The record did not 
indicate any convictions. The Corvette vehicle observed at the Blomquist residence was in 
fact the vehicle referred to by the anonymous informants and the vehicle was in fact 
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registered to defendant Edenfield 
9. Even though the information received in September of 1992 from a confidential 
informant known to Officer Blackhurst was approximately six months old at the time of the 
acquiring of the search warrant, nevertheless such information as contained in the affidavit 
was consistent and corroborated by further informants and by the independent investigation 
by the police officers. 
10. This court finds that considering the totality-of-the-circumstances contained in the 
affidavit there was a sufficient basis for the magistrate in making a practical and common 
sense decision to find that there was a fair probability that the evidence sought would be 
found in the Edenfield vehicle, in the Blomquist residence and/or on the persons of 
Edenfield and Blomquist. This court finds the search warrant was based upon adequate 
probable cause and lawfully issued. 
11. This court admits that the testimony regarding the time sequences on March 11, 1993 
are somewhat confusing. Despite the confusion in the actual hours testified to by the 
officers, the officers were consistent in that they had received notice that the search warrant 
was signed before any search was made of the vehicle, persons or Blomquist residence. 
12. Defendant Blomquist was arrested because of the outstanding warrant in the Pleasant 
Grove City court. It is the further finding of this court that defendant Edenfield was not 
searched until such time as the search warrant had been signed. It is the further finding of 
this court that the Blomquist residence and the Edenfield vehicle were not searched until the 
search warrant was appropriately executed by Judge Dimick. 
13. This court further finds that the stop of the Edenfield vehicle and the temporary 
detention of the defendants prior to the physical arrival of the search warrant was 
appropriate. This court adopts the facts and the application of the facts to the law of this 
state regarding exigent circumstances as set forth in the Plaintiffs Memorandum on pages 6, 
7, 8 and 9. 
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14. Defendant Edenfield contends that the police officers had no right to search her purse. 
Edenfield had the purse with her when the vehicle was stopped and Edenfield took the purse 
with her to the police station. This court finds that the defendant's allegation that the purse 
of Edenfield was not a part of her person to be without merit. 
15. The court further adopts the statement of facts and law as applied to the facts of this 
case from the Plaintiffs Memorandum regarding search and seizure of evidence from 
Edenfield lawful under the good faith-inevitable discovery rule. The court finds that the law 
as stated by counsel is in fact the law of the state of Utah and that should for any reason 
evidence taken from the purse of Edenfield be subject to the exclusionary rule, that evidence 
would still be admissible under the tfinevitable discovery" or the "independent source" 
doctrine. 
16. Defendants' Motion to Suppress is denied. 
17. Counsel for the plaintiff shall prepare findings and conclusions and order for this court 
consistent with the above and submit the same to counsel for the defendants for approval as 
to form. 
Dated this 15th day of September, 1993. 
BOYD L. PARK, JUDGE 
cc: Utah County Attorney 
Shelden Carter, Esq. 
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